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Thirty-two years ago, the United States Supreme Court struck down 
the conception-to-birth prohibitions on abortion that had operated for at 
least a century in almost every state.2  As women learned they needed no 
longer choose between involuntary parenthood and the secretive, often 
fatal underworld of criminal abortion, the impact of the ruling resonated 
across the nation.  But the practices Roe ended that day in 1973 were by 
no means remote.  The streets and back alleys in the shadow of One First 
Street, N.E. had witnessed a rich history of illegal abortion for decades 
before the Court’s stately edifice was erected on that site.  Since the 
comprehensive prohibition statute of 1872, Washington D.C. had been 
home to the nameless practitioners, clandestine contacts, bribery, raids, 
arrests, and prosecutions that typified the illegal practice of abortion in 
America.
To explore the District of Columbia’s experience of criminal abortion, 
this article undertakes a historical survey of the state and the development 
of law before prohibition, the enactment, evolution and justification of 
prohibition, and the records left by those who fell foul of the law.  Part I of 
this article examines the history of abortion regulation from theological, 
philosophical, and political perspectives.  Beginning with Greek and 
Hebrew approaches to fetal development and tortious miscarriage, Part IA 
proceeds through early Christian and medieval reasoning to arrive at the 
“quickening” distinction in the Common Law, which designated the first 
fetal movement as the moment of ensoulment and thus of full legal 
protection.  Part IB then examines the nineteenth-century physicians’ 
campaign that engendered the District’s 1872 statute.  This section 
inquires into the self-interested motivations of the American Medical 
Association in restricting abortion to its members’ control, together with 
the dubious physiological and social arguments the campaign brought to 
bear in support of its cause.  Part II then examines the various proposed 
and enacted District of Columbia statutes that grew out of the nineteenth-
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century anti-abortion movement.  Part III of this article constructs an 
anecdotal history of criminal abortion experiences based on published 
opinions of District of Columbia courts.  This history yields narratives of 
desperate women’s tragic deaths, their legal disabilities and ordeals in the 
courts, targeting of physicians by the government, bribery of witnesses 
and police by the accused, and defenses ranging from the obvious to the 
bizarre.  The survey of cases culminates with United States v. Vuitch,3 the 
test case that, for a brief period, left D.C. the most liberal abortion 
jurisdiction in the United States, and galvanized the nationwide legal 
challenge to abortion prohibitions.
The history of criminal abortion is no mere academic curiosity.  The 
debate over abortion regulation continues to divide America, and the 
future of unrestricted abortion remains in doubt.  Both sides of the debate 
are myopic in their rhetoric: abortion rights supporters advocate personal 
autonomy without reference to fetal protection; abortion opponents 
champion fetuses while dismissing women’s interests in self-
determination.  In order to effectively rule and legislate on abortion, jurists 
and politicians must understand the complex philosophical history that 
underlies the moral and political debate.  More importantly, they must 
understand the social history of criminal abortion, to understand the 
inevitable consequences of prohibition.  This article’s choice of focus was 
motivated by the belief that a social history unfolding in the very 
neighborhoods where national leaders live and work will prove especially 
compelling.
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO 
ABORTION REGULATION
Within the span of seventy-two years, District of Columbia law 
progressed from a complete absence of codified abortion regulations to a 
near-total ban on the practice.  In order to understand the pre-statute legal 
status of abortion and the rapid move to prohibition, this section begins 
from first principles and traces the philosophical and political history of 
abortion from classical antiquity into the nineteenth century.  
3
 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
THE ALLEY BEHIND FIRST STREET, NORTHEAST 3
A.  The Common Law View of Abortion
The essential conflict in the modern debate over abortion is between 
women’s personal autonomy and privacy interests and the putative fetal 
interest in avoiding injury and death.  But given the subordinate status 
women held in most cultures from at least the agricultural revolution into 
the twentieth century, the historical abortion debate was not conducted in 
those terms.  Female autonomy was hardly a concern of natural and 
religious philosophers; the propriety of abortion would depend solely on 
fetal status.  Nonetheless, what the law does not proscribe it tacitly allows, 
and so any restriction of abortion based on fetal personhood necessarily 
required some rational justification if it were to legitimately abridge a 
previously unrestricted practice.  One necessary element of this rational 
foundation must be a determination as to the gestational moment at which 
the proposed fetal protection attaches.  Logically, there are three temporal 
options from which to choose.  The fetus may acquire protected status at 
the moment of conception, at the moment of birth, or at some intermediate 
moment.  The ultimate solution of the Common Law – an intermediate 
gestational point known as “quickening” – resulted from centuries of 
evolution and synthesis among natural, legal, and religious philosophy.
1. The biblical origins of mid-gestational legal protection
The fountainhead of Western theological reasoning on fetal status is 
the tortious miscarriage provision of 21 Exodus 22-25:
And if two men are fighting and one should strike a pregnant 
woman so that her fruits come forth, but there is no harm, then he 
shall certainly be fined as the woman’s husband imposes on him, 
and he shall pay as the judges assess.  But if harm should occur, 
then you must give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand 
for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for 
bruise.4
4
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The precise meaning of this passage is obscure.  Under one 
interpretation, it means that tortious miscarriage is punishable by fine 
only, but harm to the adult woman is punishable according to the lex 
talionis.5  Under this reading, the fetus enjoys a lesser legal protection than 
the mother, or possibly no protection at all (since the fine paid to the father 
may be seen as compensation for the loss of an heir, rather than a penalty 
to punish commission of a wrong).  Thus, this reading places the point of 
legal protection at birth.
However, an alternative interpretation holds that, because the word 
 (-son, “harm”) takes no indirect object in the text, and because the 
tortious wounding or killing of an adult is proscribed elsewhere in the 
Pentateuch6 – thus obviating the need for a special provision protecting 
pregnant women independent of their fetuses – lex talionis does apply to 
fetal harm.7  Indeed, because the passage can be read as referring to 
premature birth as well as miscarriage, the law may contemplate 
intermediate punishments for non-fatal harm to the fetus; should the child 
be born disfigured or disabled, the appropriate lex talionis corporeal or 
monetary sanction would be imposed on the tortfeasor.8  Under this 
viewpoint, the fetus does enjoy equal protection with the mother, since the 
same scale of penalties applies to those who harm either.  Furthermore, no 
intermediate gestational date must be achieved by the fetus to obtain the 
law’s protection under this reading; at least in theory (notwithstanding 
obvious evidentiary problems) the fully-protected status would attach at 
conception.
Whichever of these interpretations is “correct,” it is clear that by the 
third century B.C., the Alexandrian Jewish community had adopted the 
former.9  The Septuagint (the Alexandrian Jews’ translation of the Hebrew 
bible into the Greek vernacular), renders the “” rule as turning not on 
whether “harm” or “no harm” is present, but rather on whether or not the 
used the literal “fruits” rather than “children,” and the literal “come forth” rather than 
“are born,” “abort,” or “miscarry.”  I have also refrained from interpolating “further” 
before “harm,” as some modern versions do, because it is not supported by the literal 
text and prejudices the solution to the ambiguity addressed in this discussion.
5
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child is born 	
µ
 (exeikonismenon, “fully formed”).10  In other 
words, if tortious injury to a pregnant woman caused the miscarriage of a 
fetus not fully formed, then a fine would apply, but if a fully formed fetus 
were stillborn, the tortfeasor was liable according to the lex talionis.  Thus, 
by at least the third century B.C., 21 Exodus 22-25 had come to signify a 
mid-gestational point for the attachment of fetal protection under the law.
2. Development of the quickening concept from the mid-
gestational onset of legal protection
The Septuagint became the basis for early Christian Latin versions of 
the Pentateuch, and thus the Alexandrian interpretation of fetal 
personhood as attaching mid-gestation became the accepted view within 
the early Christian church.11  But the exact point at which protection 
attached was not defined; the distinction between tortious miscarriage and 
capital feticide was determined only post hoc, based on the evidentiary 
standard of 	
µ
.  In forming a more precise rule of fetal law, 
the early church turned its attentions to ideas developed a century before 
the Septuagint’s translation: the natural philosophy of Aristotle and his 
contemporaries at the Lyceum.12
Aristotle reasoned that gestation encompassed three stages, during 
which the fetus possessed three distinct “souls,” the  	 (psyche 
threptike, “nutritive soul,”) the  	, (psyche aisthitike, 
“sensitive soul,”) and the  
	 (psyche dianoitike, “rational 
soul”).13  Before infusion with the rational soul, the fetus was not human, 
but rather an undifferentiated animal; sentient, but without reason.14
Indeed, the classical Greek worldview, linked as it was to that society’s 
mythological tradition, did not exclude the notion that a human might give 
birth to a lesser animal or indeed a monster.15
Aristotle’s natural philosophy thus presented the early church with a 
more concrete basis for the mid-gestational commencement of human 
status and legal entitlement.  The Christian Neoplatonists developed 
10 Id. at 205.
11 Id. at 208-9.
12 Id. at 209.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 211.
15 Id.
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Aristotle’s concept of , and particularly  
	, into the 
Christian notion of anima, or immortal soul.  This anima is the rational 
and uniquely human essence believed to inhabit and survive the human 
body, ultimately to be reunited with it through resurrection conditioned on 
salvation.16  St. Augustine subsequently applied the Christian concept of 
anima to 21 Exodus 22-25, distinguishing the soulless – and thus 
unprotected – fetus  (embryo inanimatus)17 from the legally protected, 
ensouled embryo (embryo animatus).18
It was St. Augustine’s Neoplatonic understanding of gestation and 
ensoulment which formed the basis for St. Thomas Aquinas’s 
interpolation of mid-gestational fetal protection into the Canon Law some 
eight centuries later.19  “One would be guilty of homicide,” Augustine 
announced, “if the death either of the mother or the ensouled fetus were to 
result from a blow to a pregnant woman.”20
In medieval England, the word cwike (cwuca in Old English, later 
quycke, quicke, and eventually quick) had come to mean both “alive” and 
“moving.”21  The conflation of these dual meanings, as applied to 
Neoplatonist Christian dogma, resulted in a rather novel solution to the 
fetal status problem: the fetus’s first kick was believed to signify the 
arrival of the rational soul.22  This result was justified by either of two 
explanations.  Under the first, a kick was a “sensible” motion, and thus 
only achievable once the work of the sensitive soul was finished (i.e. the 
moment at which the rational soul was ready to take over.)  Under the 
second, a kick was a “voluntary” motion, and thus impossible until the 
rational soul had taken hold.23  The English religious understanding of 
ensoulment at quickening therefore provided a precise moment at which 
the Canon Law distinction between pre-ensoulment fetal death and post-
ensoulment homicide could be drawn.  
The Common Law’s adoption of the Canon Law distinction did not 
occur immediately.  According to Henri de Bracton’s understanding of the 
16 Id. at 213-14.
17
 The Latin usage of embryo and puerperium does not correspond with the embryo/fetus 
distinction in modern English.
18
 Scott, supra note 5, at 214.
19 Id. at 217.
20 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 2 QUAESTIO DISPUTATA DE SPIRITUALIBUS CREATURIS 64, 
quoted in Scott, supra note 5, at 218.
21 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
22
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23 Id.
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Common Law around A.D. 1230, “If one strikes a pregnant woman or 
gives her poison in order to procure an abortion, if the fetus is already 
formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened, he commits 
homicide.”24  This formulation does not comport precisely with the Canon 
Law view.  To Bracton, the abortion of any puerperium formatum 
(“formed fetus”) was homicide; the abortion of a puerperium animatum 
(“quickened fetus”), was more egregious, but it was not the sole act 
punishable as abortion.25  Thus Bracton seems to have believed that legal 
protection attached to the fetus at some point earlier in pregnancy. 
Half a century later, however, Fleta (the anonymous author of the 
primary thirteenth-century commentary on Bracton, perhaps an inmate of 
London’s Fleet prison), restated Bracton’s rule with the following 
alteration: “if the fetus is already formed and quickened . . . .”26  By 
replacing vel with et, Fleta harmonized the Common Law view with the 
contemporary Canon Law: that legal protection attached to the fetus only 
at the moment of quickening.27
The recognition of quickening as the point of ensoulment and legal 
protection seems to have continued through the Common Law’s history.  
In 1680, Edward Coke stated the law of abortion and tortious miscarriage 
thus:  
If a woman be quick with childe, and by potion or otherwise killeth 
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in 
her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe; this is a great 
misprision, and no murder: but if the childe be born alive, and 
dieth of the potion, battery or other cause, this is murder . . . .  And 
so horrible an offence should not go unpunished.  And so was the 
law holden in Bracton’s time . . . [a]nd herewith agreeth Fleta . . . 
.
28
24
 2 HENRI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 341 (Samuel E. 
Thorne, ed. 1968) (c. 1230 A.D.).
25
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Coke thus imposes an additional (perhaps evidentiary) standard of live 
birth to draw the line between misdemeanor feticide and murder.  But the 
requirement of quickening for any legal protection remains constant.  
Blackstone apparently adopted Coke’s view in compiling his 
Commentaries sixty years later: “To kill a child in it's [sic] mother's 
womb, is now no murder, but a great misprision: but if the child be born 
alive, and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it received in the womb, 
it is murder in such as administered or gave them.”29
Because Blackstone and Coke became the most important secondary 
sources of Common Law in the eighteenth-century American colonies, it 
is reasonable to assume that the earliest United States jurists shared 
Blackstone’s and Coke’s understanding of abortion.  At the time of 
American independence, the state of the law therefore appears to have 
been as follows: pre-quickening abortion was not illegal, post-quickening 
abortion was misdemeanor feticide, and post-quickening abortion that 
resulted in the birth of a live child which subsequently died of its injuries 
was murder.  
Hence, some fifteen years after American independence, the new 
District of Columbia became heir to a Common Law abortion framework 
which represented the synthesis of over two millennia’s Jewish, Greek, 
Christian, and English moral, natural, and legal reasoning. 
B. The Nineteenth-Century American Campaign for Birth-to-
Conception Prohibition
Abortion remained subject to Common Law regulation in England and 
the United States until 1803.  In that year, the British parliament passed 
Lord Ellenborough’s Act,30 making post-quickening abortion a capital 
offense.  Pre-quickening abortion was deemed a non-capital felony, 
rendering the convict “liable to be fined, imprisoned, set in and upon the 
Pillory, publickly or privately whipped . . . or to be transported beyond the 
Seas for any Term not exceeding Fourteen Years.”31
American legislatures did not take up abortion until two decades later, 
and when they did, the new laws resembled poison control measures more 
than attempts to curb abortion per se.32  Crucially, they did not abolish the 
29
 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *198 & *388.
30 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, §§ 1-2 (Eng.).
31 Id.
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THE ALLEY BEHIND FIRST STREET, NORTHEAST 9
quickening distinction, and they did not prohibit abortion so much as the 
commercial sale of patent abortifacients.33  The highly restrictive laws 
which, until 1973, criminalized most abortions from conception onward, 
emerged as the result of a concerted effort begun in 1857 by the newly-
formed American Medical Association.34  At the campaign’s head was Dr. 
Horatio Robinson Storer (1830-1922), a Boston gynecologist and surgeon.  
The success of this campaign was such that, within a quarter century of its 
inception, nearly every jurisdiction (including the District of Columbia) 
had enacted a statute criminalizing abortion from conception onward.35
It may surprise the modern reader to learn that physicians, the most 
common abortion defendants in the twentieth century, and among the 
foremost proponents of its decriminalization (viz. the familiar refrain “a 
choice between a woman and her doctor”), had engaged in a virulent 
campaign to outlaw the practice scarcely a century earlier.  In fact, this 
campaign arose out of questionably self-interested motives, presented a 
somewhat fanciful view of “scientific” embryology, and relied on rather
predictable appeals to gendered and ethnic animus.
1. Motivations behind the campaign
While the medical campaign against abortion doubtless reflected the 
legitimate moral and social beliefs of its participants, another, more 
practical motivation is apparent.  The formation of the AMA represented a 
concerted effort on the part of rigorously trained graduates of elite 
allopathic medical schools to restrict the medical franchise to 
themselves.36  Prior to this time, “regulars” as these physicians were 
known, faced virtually unrestrained competition from homeopaths, faith 
healers, midwives, and self- or apprenticeship-trained practitioners.  
Collectively, these latter groups were known as “irregulars.”37
Competition was particularly fierce in the arena of reproductive 
medicine, to which “scientific” obstetrics and gynecology were fledgling 
33 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 10.
34 Id.
35
 Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective of Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 259-60 
(1992).
36 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 10.
37 Id.
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latecomers.38  Most women employed midwives for their obstetrical 
needs, and in some cases those needs extended to abortion.39
Obstetrician/gynecologists sought to demarginalize themselves within the 
medical profession, where even the most learned among them were 
referred to as “professors of midwifery.”40  Indeed, their moral status in 
the community at large was often suspect, since these were men who made 
a profession of examining female genitalia at a time when Victorian mores 
banned even husbands from visual and manual contact with those 
organs.41
Despite reservations that they might have had about their colleagues’ 
choice of specialty, regular physicians as a whole united with the ob/gyns 
in their attempts to wrest control of reproductive medicine from irregulars.  
This struggle was central to the AMA’s interests, and not only because it 
concerned a significant area of competition.  Driving midwives out of 
business was additionally beneficial for all physicians, because nearly 
every family was likely to need reproductive medical services at some 
point.  Families who regularly employed the neighborhood midwife, the 
“regulars” feared, might from habit or familiarity turn to her as the first 
source of treatment for any ailment.  By controlling reproductive 
medicine, the AMA hoped to control the “gateway” to medicine as a 
whole.42  Thus, for reasons that may have served business as much as 
morals or public health, the medical anti-abortion movement brought to 
bear a number of arguments grounded in contemporary scientific and 
social beliefs.
2. The physiological argument
The Canon Law and Common Law views of abortion reflected both 
women’s understandings of their bodily functions43 and Judeo-Greco-
Christian religious understanding of natural philosophy.  The popular view 
of gestation comported with the maternal experience of detecting a 
separate, involuntary movement within the womb at a point approximately 
halfway through pregnancy.  This moment, at which the experience of 
38
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 283.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 283-84.
41 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 12.
42 ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE 81 (1984).
43 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 8.
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pregnancy transformed from mere physiological changes in the self to the 
direct experience of another, independent actor within the body, marked a 
logical point at which to draw the distinction between mother/child as a 
single entity and mother and child as distinct entities.  
Indeed, many women in a pre-scientific age may not have recognized 
early gestation as pregnancy at all, but rather as a period of “blocked 
menses,” which was sometimes, but by no means always, a precursor to 
quickening and true pregnancy.44  The perceptional disconnect between 
cessation of menstruation and the onset of pregnancy is perhaps 
explainable by the frequency of spontaneous early miscarriage, and the 
prevalence of true (i.e. non-gestational) amenorrhea as a symptom of 
illness or malnutrition.  Thus, when some women took home-preparations 
– and later patent medicines – made up of pennyroyal, tansy, ergot, 
snakeroot, cotton root, or savin (juniper extract), it is possible that they did 
not conceptualize them as abortifacients terminating pregnancies, but 
rather remedies that would “bring on the menses,” i.e. cure their 
amenorrhea.45
As discussed in section IA, legal and religious understandings of 
abortion were premised on metaphysical notions of rational ensoulment, 
but dovetailed with popular understandings of the body in that they 
adopted quickening as the moment of delineation.  
Not surprisingly, organized medicine, which saw itself as a scientific 
movement at odds with folk or religious natural philosophy, set about 
attacking these traditional understandings of gestation.46  The medical 
movement dismissed quickening as of no scientific significance,47 and 
ensoulment theory as “metaphysical speculation.”48  It sought instead to 
introduce contemporary embryology as the model by which fetal rights 
should be determined.  
Autonomous life, the movement argued, began at conception, because 
at that point the embryo possessed an independent capacity for growth.49
The fact that a fetus was generally not viable before seven months did not 
matter to Dr. James Whitmire, who proclaimed that “[t]he truly 
44 Id.
45 Id. at 9.
46
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 288.
47 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 12.
48
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 288.
49 Id.
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professional man's morals . . . are not of that easy caste, because he sees in 
the germ the probable embryo, in the embryo the rudimentary fœtus, and 
in that, the seven months viable child and the prospective living, moving, 
breathing man or woman . . . .”50  Furthermore, because the embryo was 
attached to the mother only by the umbilicus, and then only via the 
placenta, the movement argued that the embryo was in a scientific sense 
an independent being.51
This notion of physical and moral disconnect from the mother was 
crucial to the movement’s proffered explanation of gestation.  Storer 
announced that an unfertilized egg “may perhaps be considered as a part
and parcel” of a woman before conception, “but not afterwards.”52  He 
compared the embryo to a nursing infant, asserting that 
[t]his is no fanciful analogy; its truth is proved by countless facts.  
In the kangaroo, for instance, the offspring is born into the world at 
an extremely early stage of development . . . and then is placed by 
the mother in an external, abdominal, or marsupial pouch, to 
portions of which corresponding, so far as function goes, at once to 
teats and to the uterine sinuses, these embryos cling by an almost 
vascular connection, until they are sufficiently advanced to bear 
detachment, or in reality to be born. . . . The first impregnation of 
the egg, whether in man or in kangaroo, is the birth of the offspring 
to life; its emergence into the outside world for wholly separate 
existence is, for one as for the other, but an accident in time.53
The physiological picture of gestation presented by the medical anti-
abortion movement, then, was a systematic attempt to discredit the popular 
and religious understanding of the fetus as one with its mother throughout 
pregnancy, and not uniquely human until the moment of quickening.  
Instead, the movement sought to substitute a view of a protected, 
miniature (usually male) adult, who, though he appears at first as “the 
invisible product of conception,” inevitably “develop[s], grows, passes 
through the embryonic and fœtal stages of existence, appears as the 
50 James S. Whitmire, Criminal Abortion, 31 CHI. MED. J. 385, 392 (1874), quoted in
Siegel, supra  note 35, at 291.
51
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 288.
52 HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 17 (Boston, 
Lee & Shepard 1866), quoted in Siegel, supra  note 35, at 289.
53 STORER, supra note 52, at 29-30, quoted in Siegel, supra  note 35, at 289-90.
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breathing and lovely infant, the active, the intelligent boy, the studious 
moral youth, the adult man, rejoicing in the plenitude of his corporeal 
strength and intellectual powers, capable of moral and spiritual 
enjoyments . . . .”54
In an age that came to worship science almost as a new religion, the 
practitioners of a scientific profession were at a distinct advantage in 
winning the public over to their cause.  If its arguments bent the finer 
points of biological understanding to a rhetorical purpose, the physicians’ 
movement doubtless felt this small mendacity justified.  Removing 
irregulars from the practice of reproductive medicine, they likely 
reasoned, was to everyone’s benefit, because it meant the general 
substitution of scientific healing for folk medicine.  But Victorian America 
had other preoccupations, and it was to these that the anti-abortion 
movement next appealed.    
3. The social order argument
Abortion, its medical critics urged, threatened to undermine the social 
order because it distracted women from their physiologically-determined 
roles of wives and mothers, and made them easier prey for the misguided 
proponents of feminism.  Women selfishly sought abortions, it was 
argued, “to avoid the labor and the expense of rearing children, and the 
interference with pleasurable pursuits, fashions, and frivolities,”55 and by 
doing so chose “an indolent, selfish life, neglecting the work God ha[d] 
appointed [them] to perform."56
The physicians’ anti-abortion movement was openly hostile to the 
feminist movement, which it saw as promoting female abandonment of 
maternal duty: 
"Woman's rights" now are understood to be, that she should be a 
man, and that her physical organism, which is constituted by 
Nature to bear and rear offspring, should be left in abeyance, and 
54 HUGH HODGE, FŒTICIDE, OR CRIMINAL ABORTION 25 (Philadelphia, Lindsay & 
Blakiston 1869), quoted in Siegel, supra note 35, at 290.
55 ANDREW NEBINGER, CRIMINAL ABORTION; ITS EXTENT AND PREVENTION 11 
(Philadelphia, Collins 1876), quoted in Siegel, supra  note 35, at 302.
56 AUGUSTUS K. GARDNER, CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE LAWS OF LIFE AND HEALTH
225 (New York, J.S. Redfield 1870), quoted in Siegel, supra  note 35, at 303.
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that her ministrations in the formation of character as mother 
should be abandoned for the sterner rights of voting and law 
making.57
Indeed, the notions of reproductive choice and electoral choice were 
conflated by members of the movement, who warned that women sought 
not only to vote for political leaders, but also to “elect” how many children 
they would have.58  Although the nineteenth-century feminist movement 
was almost monolithic in its opposition to abortion, which it viewed as an 
evil forced upon women by lustful husbands and deceitful suitors,59 the 
anti-abortion movement nonetheless blamed feminists for tacitly 
encouraging abortion through engendering an illicit desire to shirk female 
responsibilities.60
The rhetorical genius of the anti-abortion movement’s attack on 
feminism was its success in turning feminist arguments about marriage 
and sexual morality precisely on their heads.  Nineteenth-century 
feminism advocated “voluntary motherhood,” which essentially meant 
female control of marital sexuality.61  The classical legal understanding of 
marriage bestowed on the husband rights in his wife’s labor and sexuality, 
in exchange for his duty of support.62   The feminist movement saw this 
arrangement as little better than chattel slavery and legalized 
prostitution.63  Further, it argued, the approach to sexuality which society 
imposed on females – chastity until marriage, monogamy afterwards –
was morally superior to the standard it tacitly approved for males –
lifelong patronization of (actual) prostitutes and marital infidelity.64
The anti-abortion movement reversed this rhetoric, lobbing it back at 
its source with Storer’s charge that women who aborted (and thus, 
presumably, many feminists) committed a sin of precisely equal gravity as 
men who visited prostitutes.65  Indeed, abortion further threatened female 
morality, it was argued, because it threatened female chastity and thus 
57 Montrose A. Pallen, Fœticide, or Criminal Abortion, 3 MED. ARCHIVES 193, 205 
(1869), quoted in Siegel, supra  note 35, at 303-304.
58
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 304.
59 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 12.
60
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 303.
61 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 12.
62
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 305.
63 Id. at 308.
64 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 12.
65 Id.
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every family’s interests in descent.66  While the medical anti-abortion 
movement was directed primarily at married women, the charge that 
abortion permitted unmarried women to have sex was also of importance.  
With the availability of abortion, female chastity could not so easily “be 
enforced with severe social and legal sanctions, among which fear of 
pregnancy function[s] effectively and naturally.”67
The medical anti-abortion movement further appropriated the
“legalized prostitution” metaphor, arguing that it was marriage without 
child bearing, rather than “ordinary” marriage, which gave rise to this 
condition.68  The physicians argued that “so long as man’s sexual urge 
were allowed expression in marriage without reproductive consequence . . 
. the very aspiration to avoid maternity [was] an expression of unnatural 
egoism or immoral license,” i.e. legalized prostitution.69  Indeed, at least 
one physician implied that not only might feminism cause the evil of 
abortion, abortion might cause the evil of feminism. William Goodell 
argued that women engaging in contraception or abortion turned to 
feminism because 
[t]he sexual instinct has been given to man for the perpetuation of 
the species. . . . Dissociate one from the other, and . . . wedlock 
lapses into licentiousness; the wife is degraded into a mistress . . . 
[she] takes distorted views of life and of the marriage relation, and 
harbors resentment against her husband as the author of all her 
ills.70
The elite physicians who led the anti-abortion campaign of the 
nineteenth-century were predominantly American-born men of English 
and German lineage.71  Given the social concerns of the time, it was 
natural that their arguments should also play on “native” fear of immigrant 
elements.  Fertility among the native-born, Protestant classes had declined 
relative to that of immigrants by 1850, and some attributed this disparity 
66 PETCHESKY, supra note 42, at 82.
67 PETCHESKY, supra note 42, at 82.
68
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 308.
69 Id. at 309-10.
70 Id. at 309.
71 PETCHESKY, supra note 42, at 82.
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to the disproportionate practice of abortion among native-born women.72
One year after the surrender at Appomattox, Storer asked his readers 
whether “the fertile savannas of the South, now disenthralled and first 
made habitable by freemen … [would be] filled by our own children or by 
those of aliens?”73  At the same time as “gaps in our population … have 
late been made by disease and the sword … the great territories of the far 
West … offer homes for countless millions yet unborn,” he mused, and 
charged that the ethnic makeup of those future Americans was “a question 
that our own women must answer; upon their loins depends the future 
destiny of the nation.”74
This fear of ethnic outnumbering was widespread among the anti-
abortionists.  Augustus Gardner dedicated his tract “[t]o the Reverend 
Clergy of the United States who by example and instruction have the 
power to arrest the rapid extinction of the Native American People."75
And it was explicitly political, as attested to by Dr. H.S. Pomeroy’s 
observation that “our voters – and so our lawmakers and rulers, indirectly, 
if not directly – come more and more from the lowest class, because that 
class is able and willing to have children, while the so-called better classes 
seem not to be.”76
Thus, the anti-abortion movement successfully exploited Victorian 
concerns about the effect of sexual and reproductive control on women’s 
propensity to violate social norms and shirk prescribed maternal duties.  It 
effectively appropriated the rhetoric of the nineteenth-century feminist 
movement, forcing its idiom through the looking glass of moral blame, 
and accusing (hardly pro-abortion) feminists of the very licentiousness 
they attributed to men.  But as the movement attacked the women of its 
members’ own social and ethnic class for their behavior, it likewise sought 
to persuade them that all class members should unite against the common 
enemy of immigrant domination.
The District of Columbia had inherited a Common Law abortion view 
drawn on centuries of personal, religious, and philosophical understanding 
of pregnancy and the body.  Yet just seven decades after its creation, the 
72 REAGAN, supra note 32, at 11.
73 STORER, supra note 52, at 85, quoted in Siegel, supra note 35, at 299; see also
REAGAN, supra note 32, at 11.
74 Id.
75
 Siegel, supra note 35, at 298.
76 H.S. POMEROY, THE ETHICS OF MARRIAGE 39 (New York, Funk & Wagnalls 1888), 
quoted in Siegel, supra  note 35, at 298.
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District bowed to a self-interested pressure group’s quasi-scientific, anti-
feminist, and anti-immigrant campaign to ban abortion.  During a brief 
period of home rule, the District’s legislature passed a prohibition that 
would drive its women and its abortion providers underground for 101 
years. 
II. ABORTION STATUTES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. The Law Prior To 1872
At the time of its creation in 1800, the District of Columbia was 
subject to existing Maryland and Virginia statutes, and, if not superceded, 
to pre-1776 English Common Law and statutes in force by 1776.77  The 
Common Law understanding of abortion was apparently sufficient for the 
District; no mention of abortion appears in the first compilation of D.C. 
laws (the “Cranch Code”) or in the municipal ordinances of the City of 
Washington.78
In 1855, an Act of Congress called for the creation of a code for the 
District, to be approved by a popular vote of District residents.79  Chapter 
130, §§ 15-17 of the code (compiled in 1857) would have provided D.C’s 
first abortion statute.  The language is somewhat akin to the Common Law 
pre- versus post- “quickening” standard as articulated in section I of this 
article, but potentially ambiguous:
Sec. 15.  Any physician or other person who shall administer to 
any woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine, drug, or 
substance whatever, or shall use any instrument or other means 
77 History of the D.C. Code, in D.C. CODE 1 (2001 Ed.).  Although comprising a unified 
political entity, the District’s two counties were subject to different laws.  
Washington county – the land East of the Potomac ceded by Maryland – was subject 
to Maryland law; Alexandria County – the land West of the Potomac ceded by 
Virginia – was subject to Virginia law.  When Alexandria county was retroceded to 
Virginia in 1847, Virginia law ceased to apply anywhere within the District of 
Columbia.
78 See generally W. CRANCH, ED., CODE OF LAWS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
(Washington, Davis & Force 1819); LAWS OF THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF 
WASHINGTON (Washington, De Krafft 1833); 1 CORPORATION LAWS OF THE CITY OF 
WASHINGTON (Washington, Waters 1853).
79
 10 Stat. 642 (1855).
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with intent to destroy such child, shall, in case of the death of such 
child or mother in consequence thereof, be imprisoned in the 
penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years.
Sec. 16.  Any physician or person who shall willfully administer to 
any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, 
or use any instrument or other means, with the intent thereby to 
procure the miscarriage of such woman, shall, upon conviction, be 
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than two nor 
more than ten years.
Sec. 16.  No person shall be published by reason of any act 
mentioned in the two sections immediately preceding, where such 
act is done in good faith, with the intention of saving the life of 
such woman or child.80
Precisely what distinction the drafters sought to create between § 15 
and § 16 is uncertain.  Literally read, the sections criminalize both 
attempted and successful pre-quickening abortion, but only successful 
post-quickening abortion.  This reading seems problematic because the 
greater penalty for post-quickening abortion suggests that the drafters 
believed it the more serious crime.  It is therefore unlikely that they would 
have excused its attempt, while criminalizing unsuccessful pre-quickening 
abortions.  
It is plausible that, taken together with § 15, “pregnant” in § 16 implies 
quickening.  Under this reading, pre-quickening abortion would be no 
crime; post-quickening abortion would be criminal, and the penalties 
would differ for completion and attempt.  This ambiguity would doubtless 
have proven fruit for vigorous judicial construction, but the proposed code 
was never ratified, and abortion in D.C. would remain subject to the 
Common Law for another fifteen years.81
80 ROBERT OULD & WILLIAM B.B. CROSS, EDS., REVISED CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 516 (Washington, 1857).
81 History of the D.C. Code, supra note 77, at 8.
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B. The 1872 Act
In 1872, the short-lived Legislative Assembly for the District of 
Columbia passed a comprehensive abortion prohibition.82  Section One 
provides that
[a]ny person who shall administer, or cause to be administered, to 
any woman in any condition of pregnancy, any medication, drug, 
substance, or thing whatsoever, with the intention thereby to 
produce a miscarriage . . . or shall use on any such woman any 
instruments, or any other means for said purposes, shall, in case of 
the death of said woman . . . or in case of the death of the child 
therefrom, be guilty of manslaughter, and be punished . . . by 
imprisonment at hard labor . . . for a period of not less than four no 
more than seven years, and be fined in a sum not exceeding one 
thousand dollars.83  [Emphasis added.] 
The differences between the 1857 and the 1872 statutes are significant.  
First, the quickening distinction is abolished; the prohibition applies to 
abortions “in any condition of pregnancy.”  Second, the law explicitly 
equates abortion with homicide, rendering the abortion provider guilty of 
manslaughter, not the separate crime of abortion.  
Section Two provides somewhat lesser penalties for aiders and 
abettors, but defines these categories widely, to sweep in not only 
procurers and assistants, but also anyone who chooses to “advise, direct, 
or counsel” abortion, or even merely “countenance or approve” the 
procedure.  It is conceivable that attempted abortion might be prosecutable 
under this section’s broad language.84
Section Three provides a life-of-the-mother exception, with an 
additional requirement that at least one other physician concur in the 
decision.85  Sections Four and Five prohibit the sale of abortifacients 
except on the written prescription of a licensed “graduated” physician, and 
82 ACTS & RESOLUTIONS OF THE SPECIAL SESSIONS OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 26 (Washington, Chronicle 1872).
83 Id. at 26-27.
84 Id. at 27.
85 Id.
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require that pharmacists keep a separate register of all such 
dispensations.86  Section Six forbids the advertisement of abortifacients, 
although cleverly avoids the appearance of prior restraint by providing a 
five-day notice requirement before charges may be brought.87  Section 
Seven requires the District Coroner to analyze all suspected abortifacients 
and abortion instruments whenever there is suspicion of an abortion.88
Section Eight permits the testimony of co-conspirators to abortion against 
one another, and provides both civil and criminal immunity to such 
testimony.89
C. Section 22-201
In 1901, all previous D.C. statutes were superceded by the 
congressional Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of 
Columbia.90  The 1901 code pared the 1872 Act down to a single 
paragraph:
Sec. 809. PROCURING MISCARRIAGE.—Whoever, with intent to 
procure the miscarriage of any woman, prescribes or administers to 
her any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or with like intent 
uses any instrument or means, unless when necessary to preserve 
her life or health and under the direction of a competent licensed 
practitioner of medicine, shall be imprisoned for not more than five 
years; or if the woman or her child dies in consequence of such act, 
by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than twenty 
years.91
The 1901 code thus adopts the 1872 statute’s from-conception 
prohibition.  It retains the life-of-the-mother exemption, and adds a health 
exemption.  It eliminates the complex regulation of pharmacists, although 
presumably the unauthorized sale of abortifacients is proscribed by the 
“administers . . . unless under the direction of” language.  It reintroduces 
86 Id. at 27-28.
87 Id. at 28.
88 Id. at 28-29.
89 Id. at 29.
90
 31 Stat. 1189 (1901).
91
 An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, ch. 854 § 809, 31 Stat. 
1322 (1901) (codified at D.C. Code ch. 19, § 809 (1901)) (recodified at D.C. Code § 
22-201 (1940)) (current version at D.C. Code Ann. § 22-101 (2001)).
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the statutory distinction between attempted and completed abortion, and it 
imposes quite a severe maximum penalty on the latter: twenty years, as 
opposed to only seven under the 1872 Act.
Section 802, recodified as § 22-201 in 1940,92 persisted in this form 
until 1953.  In that year, Congress passed the District of Columbia Law 
Enforcement Act of 1953.93  As part of the Act, § 22-201 was amended to 
read:
Whoever, by means of any instrument, medicine, drug or other 
means whatever, procures or produces, or attempts to procure or 
produce an abortion or miscarriage on any woman, unless the same 
were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or 
health and under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner 
of medicine, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than 
one year or not more than ten years; or if the death of the mother 
results therefrom, the person . . . shall be guilty of second degree 
murder.94  [Emphasis added.]
As indicated, this statute eliminates the distinction between attempted 
and completed abortion, and thereby raises the maximum penalty for the 
former, while lowering the maximum penalty for the latter.  It also 
dramatically increases the consequences of killing the patient.  While 
earlier laws had recognized patient death as essentially an aggravating 
circumstance of abortion, the 1953 statute labels the hapless abortion 
provider as murderer, regardless of his or her actual intent, and without 
even a showing of recklessness in performing the operation.  An earlier 
version of the 1953 Act would have removed the health-of-the-mother 
exception, but this provision was abandoned for reasons which are not 
apparent from the legislative history.95
92
 D.C. Code § 22-201 (1940).
93
 District of Columbia Law Enforcement Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 83-85 ch.159 § 203, 
67 Stat. 93 (codified as amended at D.C. Code §22-201 (1966)) (current version at 
D.C. Code Ann. § 22-101 (2001)).
94 Id.
95 Hearing on the District of Columbia Law Enforcement Act Before the House Comm. on 
the District of Columbia, 83d Cong. 55, 57 (1954) (statement of Hon. Samuel 
Spencer, Commissioner, District of Columbia), microformed on CIS no. 83 HD-T.13 
(Cong. Info. Serv.).  
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Section 22-201, later recodified as § 22-101,96 remained in force as 
amended until rendered unconstitutional in 1973 by Roe v. Wade.97
Curiously, it has never been repealed, and remains in the current D.C. 
Code.98  While its survival might superficially suggest oversight, it is 
notable that a typographical error within the text of the 1953 Act’s 
abortion section was corrected by the D.C. Council in 1989, as part of a 
technical amendments act that eliminated numerous other obsolete 
sections.99  Three decades into its obsolescence, § 22-101 remains the first 
offense enumerated in D.C.’s criminal code, a vestigial reminder of a 
century’s criminal abortion.
III. THE EXPERIENCE OF CRIMINAL ABORTION IN THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS REFLECTED IN THE REPORTED 
CASES
Abortion is by its nature private, and countless thousands no doubt 
took place without record during the District’s century of prohibition.  
Where, however, the private act of abortion was forced into public view 
by a criminal prosecution, judicial opinions provide a historical window 
into this illegal practice.  Appellate records are imperfect sources of 
history for numerous reasons.  Facts are subordinated to law, and only 
those relevant to the issues on appeal need be reported.  Appealed cases 
are by no means representative of all cases brought – the stories of those 
defendants who pled guilty, were acquitted, or lacked financial means to 
appeal left no mark on the published case reports.  But given these 
limitations, the reported cases permit a rare glimpse into the social, 
practical, and legal troubles faced by participants in the shadow world of 
criminal abortion.
The D.C. reported cases100 concern twenty-one charged abortions or 
attempts, although a number of cases refer to additional abortions as 
96
 D.C. Code, 1973 Ed. § 22-101.
97
 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98
 D.C. Code, 2001 Ed. § 22-101.
99
 Technical Amendments Act of 1988, preamble and § 28, 36 D.C. Reg. 492 (codified as 
amended at D.C. Code Ann. § 22-101 (2001).
100
 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971)[hereinafter Vuitch II]; Copes v. United 
States, 345 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. 
Cir. 1963); Hunt v. United States, 301 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Bush v. United 
States, 301 F.2d 255  (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hopkins v. United States, 275 F.2d 155 (D.C. 
Cir. 1960); Agee v. United States, 248 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1957); McAllister v. 
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evidence of the charged abortion or other offenses.  Of these twenty-one 
abortions, seven allegedly resulted in the death of the patient.  Of twenty-
nine identifiable defendants, twenty-one were accused of performing 
abortions themselves, and five of aiding and abetting as go-betweens, 
assistants, or, in one case, the paramour of the patient.  Three additional 
defendants could be identified as to name, but not as to specific role in the 
charged abortion.  Twenty-one defendants were male; eight were female.  
Of the twenty-one alleged principal abortion providers, eleven were 
identified as medical doctors, seven were identified as non-physicians, and 
three were not identifiable by qualification.         
A. Abortion Narratives
United States, 239 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Brown v. United States, 239 F.2d 75 
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Harper v. United States, 239 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1956)[hereinafter 
Harper II]; Peckham v. United States, 226 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1955) [hereinafter 
Peckham II]; Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir.1954) [hereinafter 
Peckham I]; Spriggs v. United States, 205 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Goodloe v. 
United States, 188 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Miller v. United States, 169 F.2d 967 
(D.C. Cir. 1948); Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Hart v. 
United States, 105 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Crichton v. United States, 92 F.2d 224 
(D.C. Cir. 1937); Harrod v. United States, 29 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Kemp v. 
Board of Medical Supervisors, 46 App. D.C. 173  (D.C. Cir. 1917)[hereinafter Kemp 
II]; Kemp v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 539 (D.C. Cir. 1914)[hereinafter Kemp I]; 
Thompson v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 352 (D.C. Cir. 1908); Maxey v. United 
States, 30 App. D.C. 63 (D.C. Cir. 1907); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 
1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969)[hereinafter Vuitch I], rev’d 402 U.S. 62 (1971); United 
States v. Vincent, 292 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1968); United States v. Harper 137 F. 
Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1956)[hereinafter Harper I], aff’d 239 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In 
re Quantz 106 F. Supp. 557 (D.D.C. 1952); Warren v. United States, 310 A.2d 228 
(D.C. 1973).  Citations to historical District of Columbia cases can be confusing due 
to the shifting jurisdiction of “state” law between local and federal courts and the 
inconsistent duplication of citation forms.  At various points in the twentieth century, 
trial jurisdiction of D.C. “state” criminal offenses was held by the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.), the trial term of the now-
defunct Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (D.C.), and the Superior Court of 
the District of Columbia (D.C. Super. Ct.).  Before the creation of the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals (D.C.) in 1970, both “state” and federal appeals were 
taken to the United Stated Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
(D.C. Cir.) and its predecessor, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 
(D.C. Cir.).  See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 196-97 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 17th. Ed. 2000).
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Amid the legal analysis, the reported cases contain some compelling, 
first hand accounts of illegal abortion as it was experienced by patients, 
providers and police in the District of Columbia.  It was apparently a 
world fraught with dangers: arrest and imprisonment for the provider, 
morbidity or death for the patient.  But even if such risks did not manifest 
themselves, surely the secrecy – the code names, the intermediaries, and 
the anonymous offices – weighed heavily on all the parties, forced as they 
were into this underworld by a legal regime that excoriated their conduct.
Sadie Volk was a domestic cook who found herself three months 
pregnant in October of 1905.  She later told a court that
she went to the house of the defendant . . . and was shown into his 
office.  She inquired of defendant, who was alone, if he operated.  
He said "Yes," and that he would perform the operation.  He then 
inquired how long she had been pregnant, and her answer was 
"three months."  He caused her to recline on a sofa in the office, 
lifted her clothes, and performed an operation on her.  She could 
not see what he did.  He operated about ten minutes.  She paid him 
$15, and he told her if the operation did not have effect to return on 
the third day thereafter.101
Three days later, a Dr. McKay (presumably a “regular” physician) was 
summoned to Sadie’s house where he 
found her in her room, in bed, covered with clothes and soaked 
with blood.  Found membrane projecting from her vagina which 
meant that a child had recently been brought forth.  He examined 
into her condition.  She told him that her baby was under the bed, 
and he found it there.  She showed symptoms of having absorbed 
some poison, and he had her conveyed to the hospital for 
treatment.  The foetus was seven or eight inches long and without 
life in it.  She was apparently a stout, robust woman, and he saw 
nothing to indicate the necessity of an operation to produce a 
miscarriage in order to save her life.102
101 Thompson, 30 App. D.C at **3.
102 Id. at **3-**4.
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Claudia Parrish was only sixteen years old when she became pregnant 
by Paul Meagher in 1906.103  She was initially uncertain about the cause of 
her missed menstrual periods; her doctor attributed them to a cold and 
gave her a “some simple remedy,”104 her sister May suggested Hunyadi 
Water.105  When Claudia’s condition became more obvious, May wrote to 
Meagher, telling him that “it is up to you to do something.”106  May would 
later testify that by “do something,” she meant either that Meagher would 
marry Claudia, or come forward and admit the pregnancy to their father –
she “did not expect anything more.”107
Nevertheless, May accompanied Claudia to meet Meagher at Seventh 
Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., from whence they rode the 
streetcar to G street, S.W.108
Claudia was crying on the way.  Meagher told them they should 
tell "Mrs. Pierce" that Claudia was married, and that "Mrs. Rock" 
had sent them to her.  He showed them the house of "Mrs. Pierce," 
which was No. 41 G street, S.W.  He said he would not go past the 
house with them, because she would think detectives were 
watching her.  Just before getting to the house he got behind a 
woodpile at the corner, and stood there.  He gave Claudia $10. 
"Mrs. Maxey" answered the knock at the door, and said she 
supposed she was the person looked for.  She asked if the visit was 
about "abortion business." She told them to sit down, as she had a 
patient in the back room.  Returning she asked them if they knew 
"Mrs. Rock," and they said yes.  She said she did not see why 
Claudia should not get over it, and said she had had many patients.  
Finally she took Claudia up stairs.  She came down in about twenty 
minutes, with a towel in her hands that showed blood upon it.  
Holding it up she said it was unusual to get so much blood the first 
time.  She gave Claudia some medicine, and told her to return the 
day after tomorrow.  She said there was a possibility that Claudia 
103 Maxey, 30 App. D.C. at *2.
104 Id. at *11.
105 Id. at *5.  Hunyadi water was the bottled produce of a well in Budapest, and the 
subject of a patent dispute that reached the United States Supreme Court: see 
Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900).
106 Maxey, 30 App. D.C. at *5.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 2-3.
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might have to go to bed, and that she knew a "colored lady" who 
would take her in if she got sick; would find out and let her know 
[when Claudia returned] . . . .  [Claudia and May] left and met 
Meagher on the corner, and told him what had occurred.  He asked 
if she inquired if they knew "Mrs. Rock," and they said yes, and 
that they told the woman they knew "Mrs. Rock" very well, and 
also that Claudia was married.  He asked if the money was 
sufficient, and if Claudia was coming again.  He was told that the 
money was sufficient, and that Claudia was to return on 
Wednesday.  He rode part of the way home with them, furnishing 
the car tickets.109
The night of the abortion (a Monday), Claudia had “two chills.”110  By 
Tuesday night she was very sick, and on the Wednesday she could barely 
walk.  On Thursday morning, she dragged herself to the Riggs Hotel, 
where May worked as a telephone operator.  May sent her immediately by 
hansom cab to Columbia Hospital.  There, the following morning, “Mrs. 
Pierce’s” treatment had its intended effect – despite the surgical resident’s 
efforts to prevent miscarriage, a four-month fetus was delivered lifeless at 
11 A.M.111  But Mrs. Pierce’s catheter had brought with it something else: 
“puerperal septicemia.”112  That night, Claudia became delirious.  Over the 
next three days, Claudia’s temperature reached 105 degrees, and her pulse 
rose at times to 160 b.p.m.  By the end, an inflammatory mass larger than 
the surgeon’s fist protruded from her uterus.  Despite attempts at antiseptic 
cleansing of the uterus, Claudia died on the morning of June 27, 1906.113
On the advice of a “contact,” Mr. and Mrs. Carl Meinardus traveled 
from Brooklyn, New York to Washington D.C. in December of 1968.114
As instructed, they checked into the Skyline Inn at South Capitol and I 
Streets, S.W., and telephoned “Mary” at 554-4849.  “Mary” picked up 
Mrs. Meinardus in a taxi the following afternoon, and took her to 1425 
Fourth Street, S.W., apartment A-505.  They were greeted by a man who 
identified himself as “Dr. Ewing” (actually Thomas Phillip Martini, who 
109 Id. at 3-4.
110 Id. at 4.
111 Id. at 6.
112 Id.  This term is sufficiently non-specific as to be obsolete in modern medical usage.  
The most likely modern diagnosis given the history and symptoms would be 
chorioamniitis.  
113 Id. at 6-9.
114 Vincent, 292 F. Supp. at 730.
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had been convicted of criminal abortion in 1957 and arrested again on that 
charge in 1966).115
“Dr. Ewing” gave Mrs. Meinardus several pills and injections, then 
took her into a bedroom that had been outfitted with a gynecologist’s 
examination table.  Mrs. Meinardus placed her legs in the stirrups, and the 
“doctor” went to work.  “Mary” returned Mrs. Meinardus to the Skyline 
Inn that evening; she had been gone approximately six and one half hours.  
Although it was late, the Meinarduses drove the 230 miles back to 
Brooklyn that night.  The next morning, Mrs. Meniardus suffered severe 
cramps and was admitted to Community Hospital in Brooklyn, listed in 
critical condition due to a septic abortion.  While sixty years of medical 
progress since Claudia Parrish’s death saved Mrs. Meinardus’s life, it 
could not save her fertility.  Antibiotics controlled the infection, but she 
underwent a hysterectomy to remove her destroyed womb.116
Six decades separate the abortions of Claudia Parrish and Mrs. 
Meinardus, but the experience of criminal abortion did not change terribly 
much over that period.  A universe of clandestine contacts, pseudonyms, 
anonymous buildings, and the potential for medical complications still 
awaited any woman seeking to terminate a pregnancy outside the limited 
purview of medically sanctioned abortion.  
B. Legal Disability And Ordeal In The Courts
It is true that District of Columbia courts posed no direct threat to 
abortion patients as potential defendants.  No reported District of 
Columbia case involves the prosecution of a patient.  By 1908, courts 
explicitly interpreted the language of § 809 (later § 22-201) as applying 
only to the abortion provider.117  But while a patient was formally viewed 
as a “victim, rather than an accomplice,”118 her standing in court was often 
significantly tainted by virtue of her abortion.
In at least one case, evidence that a witness had undergone the 
abortion about which she testified was deemed a proper “bad act” for 
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Thompson, 30 App. D.C at **17-**18 (noting this construction of similar statutes in 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Texas).
118 Id. at **18.
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impeachment of her credibility.119  The trial judge in Thomspson
instructed the jury that “according to the testimony of Sadie Volk, while 
she is not an accomplice, strictly speaking, inasmuch as, from her own 
evidence, she morally implicates herself in the act, the jury should 
consider that circumstance as bearing on her credibility.”120
Because patients often provided the strongest evidence against their 
clients, defense attorneys in abortion cases had strong incentives to target 
them for character assassination.  In the trial of Dr. Henry Peckham, Jr., 
defense counsel Dorsey Offutt attempted to introduce evidence that Mary 
Ott, the complaining witness, had received psychiatric treatment at 
Bethesda Naval Hospital, and had undergone a string of earlier, unrelated 
abortions.121  According to the trial judge’s subsequent finding of 
contempt, Offut also subpoenaed Ott’s mother for no relevant purpose, 
thus forcing her to travel from Erie, Pennsylvania and listen to her 
daughter describe her abortion in open court.122  He also asked Ott “When 
were you arrested in this case,” clearly a disingenuous question intended 
to prejudice the jury, since arrest and prosecution of a patient were almost 
unknown in the District of Columbia.123
This sort of attempt to “besmirch a witness”124 appears again in In re
Quantz, where the petitioner’s trial counsel sought to introduce evidence 
of the extramarital affair that had resulted in the complaining witness’s 
pregnancy.125  Counsel also attempted to question the witness about 
119 Id. at **16-**17.  
120 Id.  The taint of abortion on credibility also seems to have applied to physicians and 
attorneys.  In Mostyn v. United States, 64 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1933), the government 
called a physician who had examined the victim of a police assault.  The victim had 
apparently been referred to the physician by his attorney, and the defense attempted 
to impeach the physician with evidence that the attorney had represented him during 
a previous grand jury abortion investigation.
121 Peckham I, 210 F.2d at 698.
122
 Offutt v. United States, 208 F.2d 842,843 (D.C. Cir. 1953), rev’d 348 U.S. 11 (1954).  
Offutt falls within an interesting line of cases on criminal contempt and the 
difficulties of securing fair adjudication by the same judge who makes the initial 
finding.  See also Offut v. United States, 232 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (appeal of 
second contempt conviction on remand from Supreme Court).  Peckham’s conviction 
was reversed partly on the basis of the antagonism with which the trial judge treated 
Offut, Peckham I, 210 F.2d at 702, but he was subsequently convicted at his new 
trial, and this conviction was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.  Peckham II, 226 F.2d at 
34.  
123 Offutt, 208 F.2d at 843.    
124 Id.
125 Quantz, 106 F. Supp. at 559. 
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previous miscarriages and abortions, about whether she had been 
completely naked when the abortion was performed, and about “an alleged 
fight between [the witness] and a Chinese woman.”126
A patient injured by a negligently performed abortion was also 
disadvantaged in the eyes of the court.  Abortion’s illegality necessarily 
precluded recovery under a breach of contract theory, since contracts 
concerning illegal acts are generally unenforceable.  But the moral taint of 
the plaintiff’s abortion also denied recovery under a tort theory in the D.C. 
case of Hunter v. Wheate.127  The court refused to sustain an action arising 
“ex turpi causa,” finding it “hardly necessary to say that in voluntarily 
participating in the miscarriage upon herself, the appellee engaged, not 
only in an unlawful act, but also in one which was immoral . . . .”128
C. Race
It is somewhat surprising that, given the District of Columbia’s history 
of segregation and racial discord, race does not play a significant role in 
the District’s reported abortion cases.  Most cases do not comment on the 
race of either provider or patient.  A notable exception, however, is Harrod 
v. United States, which expresses the moral danger blacks posed to whites 
in the public imagination of 1928.  The defendant Amanda Harrod was an 
“elderly colored woman,” convicted of performing, for a fee of $30, three 
surgical treatments on Edna K. Steinbrucker, resulting in a miscarriage.129
The police apparently interviewed Steinbrucker and her paramour Jolliffe 
after “they had observed numerous young white couples going into 
[Harrod’s] house and leaving after brief visits.”130  Upon entering the 
house, the police discovered “several white people in the house [who] 
declared they were there for similar treatments.”131
This fear that blacks were contributing to white corruption by 
performing or aiding abortions is alluded to in Maxey; the court apparently 
found it significant that Kate Maxey promised to send Claudia Parrish to a 
126 Id. at 559-60.
127
 289 F. 604 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
128 Id. at 606-7.
129 Harrod, 29 F.2d at 454.
130 Id. at 455.
131 Id.
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“colored lady” for nursing if the abortion made her sick.132  But race 
remains otherwise absent from the judicial discussion of abortion in the 
District of Columbia, albeit with the curious exception of Dr. Quantz’s 
charge that his patient had engaged in a fight with a “Chinese woman.”133
D. Governmental Targeting
While the local police seem to have enforced D.C.’s abortion laws 
passively, waiting for hospitals to report providers careless or unfortunate 
enough to maim or kill their patients, on at least one occasion the United 
States Post Office Department employed a “sting operation” to enforce its 
own federal statute.134
On November 14, 1912, Postal Inspector James Woltz sent the 
following letter from Concord, North Carolina, to Dr. Thomas J. Kemp, in 
his home office at 433 G. Street, N.W.:
My Dear Doctor: –
I trust you will pardon my writing you as I am, but I am in such 
great distress and so anxious to find some way out of it, that this is 
my only excuse.  I am a young man, married, and have been 
unfortunate enough to have gotten a young woman friend into 
trouble, to be plain, she is in a family way.  Of course, I cannot 
marry her, and the condition she is in makes it necessary that she 
be afforded relief at as early a period as possible.  She cannot 
permit the matter to go to full period either, as that would mean the 
ruin of her reputation, a thing not to be thought of.  The girl is only 
twenty-two years old and is about two and a half months gone.  If 
you can and will take this matter for us and relieve the girl of her 
trouble, will you please let me know what it will cost and about 
how long she would have to stay up there in Washington? Will it 
be necessary for her to go to a Hospital or could the business be 
done here by the use of medicines? I want to be frank and tell you 
that we have tried two or three things we saw advertised and got at 
the drug store here, but they have been without effect.
132 Maxey, 30 App. D.C. at **4.
133 Quantz, 106 F. Supp. at 560.
134 Kemp I, 41 App. D.C. at 539.
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Sincerely,
Quincy Compton.135
Dr. Kemp responded to the (fictitious) Mr. Compton general delivery 
at the Concord, North Carolina post office as follows: “Dear Sir: Your 
letter received and would say it would cost about two hundred & would 
have to stay here one week – destroy this letter – Can’t write about this 
better come – This is answer to your letter won't sign my name.”136  Some 
days later, a Detective Honvery arrived at 433 G. Street, and introduced 
himself to Kemp as “Quincy Compton.”137  Kemp told Honvery that he 
would not perform the operation in his office, but rather in a room at the 
Metropolitan hotel, which he proceeded to reserve for the supposed 
patient.138
Dr. Kemp was subsequently convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, 36
Stat. 1129 (1911), which proscribed sending any advertisement or 
information about abortion services through the mail.  On appeal, he 
argued that his letter facially contained no abortion information, that the 
offense was impossible since both the letter’s purported author and the 
patient were fictitious persons, and that he had been entrapped by the 
postal inspectors.139  The Court of Appeals ruled that the letter’s meaning 
could be taken in the context of the document to which it replied and Dr. 
Kemp’s subsequent statements and actions.140  It further held that that the 
non-existence of author or patient were immaterial, since the offense 
under § 1461 was complete upon mailing of the letter.141  And it rejected 
Kemp’s entrapment defense on the grounds that
[the letter] was not such an inducement to commit crime as the law 
condemns.  It left the way open to defendant . . . either to act the 
part of an honest man or the part of a criminal.  Without any 
influence from anyone he chose the latter course. . . . “[T]he 
allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the plea 
135 Id. at 542-43.
136 Id. at 543.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 544-48.
140 Id. at 544-46.
141 Id. at 546.
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as ancient as the world . . . 'The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.'  
That defense was overruled by the great Lawgiver . . . has never 
since availed to shield crime . . . and it is safe to say that under any 
code of civilized, not to say Christian ethics, it never will.”142
Kemp was sentenced to two years in federal prison, but his sentence 
was commuted to a fine of $500 by President Woodrow Wilson.143  The 
four-line letter did not ultimately cost Dr. Kemp his freedom, but it did 
cost him his medical license: the Board of Medical Supervisors revoked it 
on May 29, 1916.144  This administrative decision was reviewable by the 
Court of Appeals, wherein Kemp argued that his crime – the mailing of a 
letter – was not one of moral turpitude and thus could not be the basis for 
discipline on that ground.145  The court upheld the revocation, finding that 
“[a]bortion is held to involve moral turpitude. . . . Analyzing [appellant’s] 
motive . . . but one conclusion can be reached; namely, a willful and 
intentional disposition on his part, for a small pecuniary consideration, to 
prostitute his high profession.”146
E. Bribery Of Witnesses
As a class of defendants, physicians are likely to have greater financial 
resources than most individuals.  The collateral consequences of 
conviction also tend to be greater than for other defendant classes, because 
physicians’ livelihoods are dependant on both reputation and government 
licensing.  It is not surprising, then, that physicians often spent 
considerable sums litigating their defenses.  But on occasion, the 
combination of a strong motivation to escape conviction and the financial 
resources to serve that goal led District physicians to influence justice by 
illicit means.
Dr. Henry M. Ladrey was indicted under § 22-201 in October of 1943 
for performing an abortion on Hazel Queen.147  Three months later, Queen 
informed Metropolitan Police detectives that the doctor’s wife Eva had 
scheduled a meeting at Queen’s home for the evening of January 7th.  
142 Id. at 547 (quoting Board of Excise v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup. 1864)).
143 Kemp II, 46 App. D.C. at 173.
144 Id. at 174.
145 Id. at 181.
146 Id. at 181-82 (internal citations omitted).
147 Ladrey, 155 F.2d. at 418.
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That night, police Sergeants Scott and Crooke listened from a back room 
while Mrs. Ladrey offered Queen $260 to “drop the case.”148  Mrs. Ladrey 
produced an envelope containing $100, and promised the rest ($100 to 
complete the bribe and $60 as a refund of the abortion fee) once the 
charges were dropped.
Mrs. Ladrey was immediately arrested, and, according to Scott and 
Crooke’s testimony, did not deny her purpose in coming to Queen’s 
home.149  Scott and Crooke told Mrs. Ladrey that they planned to search 
the area for anyone who might have brought her to the house.  According 
to the policemen, Mrs. Ladrey then declared, “Well, I will tell you, I am 
Mrs. Ladrey.  Dr. Ladrey is waiting at 6th and Trumbell for me.”150  As 
promised, Dr. Ladrey was discovered waiting by his car at that 
intersection.  When questioned, he admitted dropping Mrs. Ladrey off in 
the vicinity, but denied knowing where she was going or what she 
intended to do.151  Unsurprisingly, the jury 
regarded as incredible the declaration of a man who lived in 
Alexandria, Virginia, that he had let his wife out of the car in the 
darkness of a winter evening at Georgia Avenue and Trumbell 
street, some miles from their residence, but that he did not know 
where she was going or what she was going to do.152
The Ladreys were convicted of attempted bribery under D.C. Code § 
22-701, and their convictions were affirmed in May, 1946.153  The 
outcome of Dr. Ladrey’s underlying abortion charge is uncertain, but his 
brush with the law evidently did not deter him from performing abortions 
upon completion of his sentence.  In November 1954, a man by the name 
of Matthews brought an anonymous patient to Ladrey’s N Street office.154
148 Id.  It is not clear from the opinion whether the government could or would have 
successfully prosecuted the case without the complaining witness.
149 Id. at 419.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 420.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 418.
154
 Ladrey v. Commission on Licensure to Practice the Healing Art in the District of 
Columbia, 261 F.2d 68, 72 (1958).
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Ladrey performed a surgical abortion, complications from which 
subsequently proved fatal.155
After making a statement at police headquarters, Matthews agreed to 
telephone Ladrey while a homicide detective listened on an extension.156
While Ladrey was not charged in the death, his incriminating statements 
were sufficient evidence for the Medical Licensure Commission to revoke 
Ladrey’s license on grounds of professional misconduct.157  Curiously, 
loss of his license did not prevent Dr. Ladrey from becoming Imperial 
Director of the Shrine Tuberculosis and Cancer Research Foundation the 
following year, a post he held until 1982.158
The pattern of an accused physician attempting to bribe his patient 
through a female intermediary was repeated in 1950 by Dr. William 
Goodloe.159  Goodloe was under grand jury investigation for allegedly 
attempting an abortion on Gloria Huffman.160  Dr. Goodloe’s offer was 
more substantial than Dr. Ladrey’s: he intended to relocate Huffman to 
California at his expense if she would depart before she was 
subpoenaed.161  Goodloe employed a female acquaintance named Alice 
Galusha to negotiate with Huffman, who was reluctant to accept.  Galusha 
rode with Goodloe to Huffman’s Baltimore home on several occasions, 
where she was ultimately arrested by policemen who observed her from a 
closet as she produced $600 and offered to purchase an airline ticket.162
Based largely on Huffman’s grand jury testimony, Dr. Goodloe was 
indicted for abortion, conspiracy, and attempted bribery; he was convicted 
on all counts and sentenced to seven years imprisonment.163
 Dr. Allen Forte, previously convicted of abortion in Alabama in 1942, 
moved his practice to Washington, D.C. at some point before 1961.164  In 
that year, Forte was indicted for allegedly performing an abortion on Jean 
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 69.
158 History of Magnus Temple #3 at
http://www.geocities.com/acejuly/magnushistory.html.
159
 U. S. v. Goodloe, 228 F. Supp. 164, 622 (D.D.C.1964).
160 Goodloe, 228 F. Supp. at 621.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 622.
163 Id. at 621.
164
 United States v. Laughlin, 222 F. Supp. 264, 293 (D.D.C. Sept. 1963) [hereinafter 
Laughlin I].
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Smith of Baltimore.165  Despite Smith’s trial testimony, Forte was 
acquitted, based on his defense that the abortion had never taken place but 
rather had been fabricated as part of a shakedown by a rogue D.C. police 
officer.166
Forte’s accusations led to a grand jury investigation of the policeman, 
but the investigation soon revealed quite a different picture of events.  
When the initial police investigation of the alleged abortion had ensued, 
Forte and his attorney James Laughlin had apparently retained the services 
of Baltimore police officer Bernice Gross.167  Not only did Gross attempt 
to obstruct the investigation on Forte and Laughlin’s behalf, she also acted 
as a go-between in their attempts to bribe Jean Smith.168  Smith, it turned 
out, had accepted cash and baby clothes from Gross in return for writing a 
letter to the United States Attorney asking to be excused as a witness.169
As a result of their bribery and the subsequent cover-up (chiefly 
Laughlin’s denial to the grand jury that he had had any contact with Gross 
despite wiretap evidence to the contrary),170 Laughlin and Forte embarked 
on a legal odyssey of at least five separate proceedings involving a 
mistrial, convictions for perjury, conspiracy, and witness tampering, 
reversal of these convictions, and eventual reconviction.171  Interestingly, 
while Laughlin retained counsel on his own behalf, he continued to 
represent Forte himself throughout.172  Laughlin may not have been a 
particularly sympathetic character in the Washington legal community.  In 
1949, he had defended Mildred Gillars, a.k.a. “Axis Sally,” the American 
Nazi propagandist of Radio Berlin.173  He reportedly accused Jean Smith 
of being a prostitute, and had apparently leveled that charge against a 
165 Id. at 289.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170
 United States v. Laughlin, 344 F.2d 187, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1965)[hereinafter Laughlin 
IV].
171 See Laughlin IV; United States v. Laughlin, 226 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 
1964)[hereinafter Laughlin III](denying government motion to vacate dismissal); 
United States v. Laughlin, 223 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C. Nov. 1963)[hereinafter 
Laughlin II](dismissing indictment); Laughlin I.
172 Laughlin I, 222 F. Supp. at 264; Laughlin II, 223 F. Supp. at 624; Laughlin IV, 344 
F.2d at 187.
173 See Dale P. Harper, Axis Sally, WORLD WAR II, Nov. 1995, available at
http://womenshistory.about.com/library/prm/blaxissally2.htm.
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female witness in a previous case.174  One witness commented that the 
grand jury investigation should be held “on a little higher standards than 
Jim Laughlin’s concept of trying a law case.”175
F. Defenses
Whatever their feelings about the social utility of their services, 
abortion defendants stood accused of a serious criminal offense.  When 
hailed into court, it was rarely prudent to rely on the political philosophy 
behind the provision of abortion.  Rather, like all accused criminals, 
abortion providers needed to advance some legal or factual theory that 
would place their conduct outside the prohibitions of the statute.   
“I didn’t do it” is of course the simplest defense to any crime.  When 
there is a dead body to be explained, this defense often results in the 
classic “plan B” – casting suspicion on another culprit.  When death 
occurs from septic abortion, the most obvious “plan B” culprit is the 
victim herself.  Kate Maxey’s defense to the abortion death of Claudia 
Parrish was accordingly straightforward: Claudia had induced the 
miscarriage and resulting infection herself.176
The difficulty with this theory was that two witnesses put Claudia 
(heretofore a stranger) in Mrs. Maxey’s house on the day of the abortion, 
and police detectives later discovered a catheter in a bedroom.177  Maxey’s 
counsel advanced what might grotesquely be termed the “pencil defense.”  
He first persuaded the government’s medical witness to admit on cross-
examination that the uterine injury could resulted from vaginal insertion of 
a lead pencil.178  He next put Maxey’s daughter-in-law Mary Lackey on 
the stand to relate a most extraordinary (if true) conversation between 
defendant and deceased.  Claudia came to the house, Lackey testified, 
seeking employment.179  For reasons which are not clear, Claudia 
informed her prospective employer that she was pregnant, that she was 
“bound to get rid of it . . .  [and was] going to do something very rash,” 
and that she had used Hunyadi water, “some kind of pill,” and a lead 
174 Laughlin I, 222 F. Supp. at 292.
175 Id.
176 Maxey, 30 App. D.C. at 71.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
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pencil to induce miscarriage.180  The catheter, Lackey claimed, belonged 
to her; Maxey often used it on Lackey to “draw water” (on medical 
orders), but she had never known Maxey to perform an abortion.181  Not 
surprisingly, the jury did not afford this defense very much weight – Kate 
Maxey was convicted along with Claudia’s paramour Paul Meagher.182
For licensed physicians, who could legitimately perform gynecological 
procedures, another defense was available: the operation took place, but it 
was not an abortion.  Dr. Alva Harper advanced this defense in 1956, 
claiming that his patient had presented with a complaint of vaginal 
bleeding.183  The procedure during which he “inserted some medicine into 
her body through an instrument known as a speculum” was not an attempt 
to abort the pregnancy, he claimed, but rather to preserve it.184
Unfortunately for Dr. Harper, the government called two rebuttal 
witnesses, each of whom testified that Harper had previously performed 
abortions on them.185  Although seemingly in violation of the “character 
propensity ban” on prior-crimes evidence, this testimony was admitted as 
evidence of Harper’s intent.186  Harper’s objection, motion for a new trial, 
and appeal on this point were rejected; he was convicted and his 
conviction affirmed.187
Dr. Harper also attempted to raise a second defense: that his patient 
may not actually have been pregnant at all when the procedure was 
performed.188  This defense would likely have failed on the facts, since the 
evidence tended to show that she was pregnant.189  But curiously, this sort 
of impossibility defense had been rejected as a matter of law the previous 
year in Peckham II.190  In that case, the D.C. Circuit approved the district 
court’s instruction to the jury that the patient’s actual pregnancy was 
immaterial so long as the defendant believed he was inducing a 
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 63.
183 Harper I, 137 F. Supp. at 5.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 7.
187 Id. at 8; Harper II, 239 F.2d at 947.
188 Harper I, 137 F. Supp. at 7-8.
189 Harper I, 137 F. Supp. at 5.
190 Peckham II, 226 F.2d at 34-35.
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miscarriage.191  Comparing the statutes of various states, it found that 
many explicitly required pregnancy, many explicitly did not require 
pregnancy, and others (including D.C. since the 1901 code) were silent on 
the matter.192  The court held that this silence should be interpreted as 
making pregnancy unnecessary, although the only support it could find for 
this ruling was contained in two nineteenth-century English cases.193
Given the language of the D.C. statute, an obvious defense to abortion 
is therapeutic necessity.  If the life or health of the patient were threatened, 
then abortion was permissible in the District of Columbia – a very liberal 
standard compared to the majority of states which allowed only life-of-
the-mother exceptions.194  But it is not immediately obvious from the 
statute whether the exception is intended as an affirmative defense or a 
necessary element in the government’s prima facie case.  This ambiguity 
was settled in 1943 when raised by the defendants in Williams v. United 
States.195  The court relied on a two-prong test, articulated by Justice 
Cardozo in Morrison v. California,196 for determining whether a statutory 
excuse requires proof by the defendant or disproof by the government.197
Under the Cardozo test, the burden of proving excuse properly belongs to 
the defense where the act is “sinister” in character unless excused, or 
where there exists “a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and 
opportunity for knowledge.”198  The Williams court found, on the second 
prong, that evidence of whether an abortion was medically necessary is 
clearly more available to the person who performs it.199  On the first 
prong, it determined that Cardozo’s “sinister act” requirement was met 
because 
“abortion is generally regarded as heinous in character . . . . The 
performance of an abortion for [non-medical] purposes is so 
offensive to our moral conception that it does not seem unjust to 
put on the defendant who has committed an abortion the burden of 
191 Id. at 34.
192 Id.
193 Id., citing R. v. Titley, 14 Cox. Crim. Cases 502 (Q.B. 1880); R. v. Goodall, 2 Cox. 
Crim Cases 41 (Q.B. 1846)).
194 See Williams, 138 F.2d. at 83-4.
195 Id. at 81.
196
 291 U.S. 82, 88 (1934).
197 Williams, 138 F.2d. at 82-3.
198 Id. at 82 (quoting Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88.).
199 Williams, 138 F.2d. at 83.
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producing evidence that the act was justified on therapeutic 
grounds.”200
This requirement remained a part of D.C.’s abortion jurisprudence for 
twenty-eight years, until the United States Supreme Court shifted it back 
to the government in United States v. Vuitch.201  The Court (authorized in 
that pre-home-rule time to interpret D.C. statutes de novo) found that
[w]hen Congress passed the District of Columbia abortion law in 
1901 and amended it in 1953, it expressly authorized physicians to 
perform such abortions as are necessary to preserve the mother's 
“life or health.” Because abortions were authorized only in more 
restrictive circumstances under previous D.C. law, the change must 
represent a judgment by Congress that it is desirable that women 
be able to obtain abortions needed for the preservation of their 
lives or health.  It would be highly anomalous for a legislature to 
authorize abortions necessary for life or health and then to demand 
that a doctor, upon pain of one to ten years' imprisonment, bear the 
burden of proving that an abortion he performed fell within that 
category.  Placing such a burden of proof on a doctor would be 
peculiarly inconsistent with society's notions of the responsibilities 
of the medical profession.  Generally, doctors are encouraged by 
society's expectations, by the strictures of malpractice law and by 
their own professional standards to give their patients such 
treatment as is necessary to preserve their health.  We are unable to 
believe that Congress intended that a physician be required to 
prove his innocence.
Perhaps the most unusual answer to a District of Columbia abortion 
charge was the insanity defense raised by Catherine Hopkins in 1959.202
After a series of telephone calls, Hopkins traveled to the home of an 
unnamed woman on March 3, 1956.203  Shortly afterward, Hopkins 
summoned her sister, a Mrs. Simmons.204  On Simmons’ arrival, she met a 
200 Id.
201
 402 U.S. 62, 70-71 (1971).
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 Hopkins v. United States, 275 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
203 Hopkins, 275 F.2d at 159 (Bastian, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 
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woman who “wished to get rid of a child,” and wanted Simmons to baby-
sit her young daughter while she and Hopkins remained upstairs.205
Simmons warned Hopkins “not to do anything that would get her into 
trouble,” but agreed to watch the girl and answer the door if anyone came 
to the house.206  What happened upstairs is unclear, but it apparently 
involved fifty dollars207 and a catheter,208 and took place in “an outrageous 
and brutal manner, the details of which are too repulsive for recital as a 
part of [a judicial] opinion.”209  The end result, in any case, was that Mrs. 
Simmons and her husband wound up rushing the woman to D.C. General 
Hospital, where, after identifying Hopkins as her abortion provider, she 
died.210
But Hopkins herself was admitted to D.C. General, where she would 
spend two months before being transferred to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital (the 
District’s mental health facility) with a diagnosis of schizophrenic 
reaction, schizoaffective type.211  After nearly two years in St. Elizabeth’s, 
Hopkins stood trial for second-degree murder (which had become the 
available charge in fatal abortion cases under the 1953 amendment to § 
22-201).  At trial, the defense presented several psychiatrists, but also 
Hopkins’ mother who testified that, ever since an ear operation at the age 
of eight, Hopkins had “just acted plum different.”212  As a teenager, her 
mother explained, Hopkins complained of hearing voices, tore out her 
hair, and attempted to jump out of windows.213  Hopkins’ mother testified 
that, on one occasion, her daughter had “called the undertaker and sent 
him to a girl friend’s home on Eleventh Street.  She sent flowers to the 
girl, and told me the girl was dead.  And I called and they said she wasn’t 
dead.”214  The District Court, sitting without a jury, convicted Hopkins, 
finding that she was not legally insane at the time of the abortion.215  But 
the Court of Appeals reversed this ruling, finding that the trial judge could 
not reasonably have found that the government had met its burden of 
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208 Id. at 161(Bastian, J., dissenting).
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proving Hopkins sane.216  It remanded the case for entry of a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity, and of an order committing Hopkins to St. 
Elizabeth’s.  
The preceding defenses run the gamut from the obvious to the bizarre, 
but all turn on either the statute’s application to the defendant’s conduct, 
or on whether the conduct is otherwise excusable.  None questions the 
propriety of the law itself.  For that type of challenge, Washington would 
have to wait for a pugnacious Yugoslav backed by a cadre of civil 
libertarians. 
G. The Constitutional Attack of United States v. Vuitch
Milan Vuitch was not unused to conflict.  Born in Serbia in 1915, he 
had completed his medical training in Hungary only to be captured during 
the Nazi invasion and conscripted into the Army Medical Corps of the 
Third Reich.217 Eventually taken prisoner by the United States Army, he 
might reasonably have grown wary of imprisonment, and led a quiet life in 
Skopie or (after his immigration in 1955) Washington.  Instead, he openly 
flouted § 22-201, bringing his skill at abortion (common in Yugoslavia) to 
bear first for the Eastern European immigrant community, and later the 
community at large.218  He appears to have been motivated by compassion 
rather than profit; he generally charged $100-$200 – a fraction of the 
going rate – and believed that “women cry for help, and doctors just chase 
them away.  I saw people dying like flies in the war, and I couldn’t do 
much.  If I can help now, why shouldn’t I?”219  Indeed, Vuitch continued 
to perform abortions even after two arrests and a trial which ended in a 
hung jury.220
Vuitch’s passion for his work and belief in its social value made him 
an ideal subject for the test case planned by a civil rights committee which 
would later become the National Abortion Rights Action League 
(NARAL).  The District’s prohibition was targeted for a number of 
216 Id. at 157.
217 LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION 9 (1973).
218 LADER, supra note 217, at 10.
219 Id. at 8.
220 Id. at 11.  After these incidents, which occurred in Maryland and Virginia, Vuitch 
restricted his abortion practice to the District of Columbia, where he believed the 
more liberal health exception of § 22-201 would render him less liable to 
prosecution.
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reasons.  First, a trial in the nation’s capital would have strong symbolic 
significance.  Second, the federal courts’ unique supervision of D.C.’s 
“state” law meant that an appellate court would have broad powers of 
statutory interpretation.  Third, § 22-201 was rare in that it permitted 
abortion to save not only the life of the patient, but also her health.221  This 
ambiguity would provide the primary basis for Dr. Vuitch’s challenge.  
Vuitch undertook a course of action calculated to result in his arrest.  
He instructed normally clandestine referral services to give his name and 
phone number openly.  He mixed abortion cases in with his general 
surgery patients, instead of performing them early in the morning or late at 
night as had been his practice.  He abandoned the use of code words and 
middlemen common to the illegal abortion community.222  These actions 
inevitably forced the police to take action, but they also removed the 
potential that secretive behavior could be used as evidence of a guilty state 
of mind.223
On May 1, 1968, the Metropolitan Police Department Homicide Squad 
raided Vuitch’s office.  They had been tipped off by a patient’s husband, 
who had impregnated his wife (along with another woman and a sixteen-
year-old girl) during a temporary reconciliation.224  This informant, 
Donald R., arrived at Dr. Vuitch’s office with his wife and $300 in marked 
bills.  Once Mrs. R was on the table, Donald signaled the police, who 
seized the operating table and instruments, arrested Dr. Vuitch, and 
transported Mrs. R. (whether or not voluntarily is unclear) to D.C. General 
Hospital for examination.225
Mrs. R. had inadvertently proved the perfect “victim” for the test case, 
because her situation fell at the margin of health risks that § 22-201 might 
conceivably permit: a purely mental health justification premised on social 
grounds.  “This woman had described her mental suffering – her 
husband’s frequent desertions and extramarital affairs, an unwanted 
pregnancy by a husband she detested – it was all down on my chart.  Only 
I, as her doctor, could decide whether her health had been threatened,” 
Vuitch asserted.226  For “the police [or] some district attorney”227 to make 
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this judgment instead of the physician created a “vague requirement, 
altogether lacking acceptable standards” and under which “there will 
never be an instance in which a physician is able to defend his actions 
successfully where the evidence shows an exercise of medical judgment . . 
. .”
228
  Thus, Vuitch would argue, application of the law violated his own
due process rights.  
But Vuitch’s challenge went beyond void-for-vagueness due process 
and struck at the very notion of the state’s legitimacy in regulating 
abortion.  In what would become the familiar twin challenges to abortion 
regulation in the United States, Vuitch argued that § 22-201 violated both 
the fundamental rights and the equal protection guarantees implied in the 
Fifth Amendment (the Fourteenth Amendment not applying to the District 
of Columbia).229  His equal protection argument concerned the 
disproportionate impact of § 22-201 on black women in the District; his 
fundamental rights due process argument followed on the holdings of 
Griswold v. Connecticut and Loving v. Virginia.230
Such was the public interest in the Vuitch case that Judge Arnold 
Gesell read his memorandum opinion from the bench to a capacity 
crowd.231  The exceptions portion of the statute was void for vagueness, 
Gesell announced, because “[t]he jury's acceptance or nonacceptance of an 
individual doctor's interpretation of the ambivalent and uncertain word 
‘health’ should not determine whether he stands convicted of a felony, 
facing ten years’ imprisonment.”232  Gesell went so far as to say that § 22-
201’s “many ambiguities are particularly subject to criticism, for the 
statute unquestionably impinges to an appreciable extent on significant 
constitutional rights of individuals.”233  But despite approving in principle 
of the equal protection and fundamental rights arguments, he was 
unwilling to strike down the statute as a whole.  He suggested that 
“Congress should re-examine the statute promptly in the light of current 
conditions,” but ultimately concluded that “[t]he court cannot legislate.”234
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230 Id., citing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
231 LADER, supra note 217, at 15.
232 Vuitch I, 305 F. Supp. at 1035.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1035-36.
44 DOUGLAS R. MILLER
For a brief moment, Washington became the only American 
jurisdiction in which legal abortion was available throughout pregnancy 
on the judgment of a single physician.  Vuitch’s practice boomed, and 
patients frequently waited up to four weeks for an appointment.235  But 
even at the height of his success, Vuitch continued to charge no more than 
$300 per case, and often operated on indigent women free of charge.236
This brief interlude in the life of Dr. Vuitch and the women of 
Washington, D.C. came to an end, however, when the Supreme Court 
determined that “health” was not overly vague, and reversed the District 
Court’s dismissal of the indictment.237
Yet, despite this defeat, the Vuitch test case had achieved much.  In its 
ruling, the Supreme Court found that § 22-201 could not be read to place 
the burden of proving medical necessity on the defendant.238  It thereby 
overturned the onerous rule of Williams.  Furthermore, in finding “health” 
not overly vague, the Court explicitly ruled that purely psychological 
injuries were permissible grounds for abortion.239  Section 22-201 was 
thus considerably weakened for the two years it survived before Roe.  But 
perhaps more importantly, the Vuitch test case inspired dozens like it in 
jurisdictions throughout the country, shaping both the jurisprudence and 
the popular will that would ultimately lead to the recognition of legal 
abortion as a constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
At the time of its creation, the District of Columbia possessed no 
written laws to govern its citizens’ practice of abortion.  But the legal 
tradition to which the District was heir encompassed a rich history of 
reasoning on its legitimacy.  The tortious miscarriage provisions of 21 
Exodus 22-25 began the recorded legal history of fetal protection law in 
Western civilization.  Although ambiguous in the Hebrew original, by the 
third century B.C., it is clear that the language of Exodus was interpreted 
to signify a mid-gestational attachment of fetal protection.  Following 
Aristotelian notions of fetal development, the early and medieval Christian 
church adopted this delineation as consistent with the Augustine notion of 
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236 Id. at 9.
237 Vuitch II, 402 U.S. at 71.
238 Id. at 68-69.
239 Id. at 69-70.
THE ALLEY BEHIND FIRST STREET, NORTHEAST 45
ensoulment.  In England, the point of attached protection was defined 
precisely at quickening, these first fetal movements taken as evidence of 
the rational soul’s arrival.  Thus the District inherited a Common Law 
abortion rule arguably in tune with women’s subjective experiences of 
their own bodies: the law of homicide protected the fetus only after its 
manifestation at quickening as an independent being.
The nineteenth-century physicians’ anti-abortion campaign sought to 
change this status quo by criminalizing abortion at all stages of pregnancy.  
The American Medical Association’s motivations for this movement were 
to a large degree self-interested and independent of the moral justifications 
it advanced.  The campaign was arguably as much about restraining 
competition from “irregulars” (especially midwives) as it was about 
preserving fetal life.  Employing imagery that ranged from miniature men 
suspended in amniotic fluid to infant kangaroos suckling in a pouch, the 
anti-abortion movement brought dubious physiological arguments to bear 
against the practice of abortion.  The movement also drew heavily on 
contemporary social concerns, painting abortion as a byproduct of 
misguided feminism, a threat to female morality and family order, and a 
tool by which immigrants would displace native-born Protestants as the 
dominant American class.  In response to this campaign, the Legislative 
Assembly of the District of Columbia passed a comprehensive conception-
to-birth abortion prohibition in 1872.
Life under this prohibition presented numerous dangers for the women 
of Washington D.C. and the abortion providers who continued to serve 
them despite the legal condemnation of their conduct.  While women were 
not prosecuted for having abortions, their reliance on under-trained 
practitioners working at remote locations without medical backup often 
proved injurious or fatal in an age before antibiotics or widespread 
understanding of sterile techniques.  Women who had undergone abortions 
faced legal disabilities before the courts: their testimony was discounted, 
they were subject to vicious cross-examination, and they were barred from 
recovery for negligent injury sustained during their abortions.  
Abortion providers were the most frequent defendants under the 
District’s abortion prohibition.  In addition to incarceration, they faced the 
loss of their livelihoods through license revocation, and loss of the 
reputation so essential to the maintenance of a medical practice.  Generally 
they escaped punishment if they did not maim or kill their patients, but 
occasionally the government was more aggressive, targeting providers 
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through postal “sting” operations.  While physicians generally used their 
money and influence to defend themselves through legal means, a few 
succumbed to temptation and sought to bribe witnesses and police.  
Abortion providers advanced a range of defenses to their alleged crimes.  
Some put forth fanciful blame-the-victim theories, others claimed that the 
operation in question had been something other than abortion, or abortion 
but with therapeutic justification.  At least one defendant claimed to have 
been insane at the time she killed her client.
The District’s abortion prohibition ultimately yielded to a 
constitutional challenge, and while it was reinstated by the Supreme Court, 
it had been significantly weakened and would survive only two more years 
until struck down by Roe v. Wade.  The century of criminal abortion in the 
nation’s capital came to an end a generation ago, but its lessons remain 
valuable as the battle over abortion rights continues to be waged in the 
city’s corridors of power.  While judges and politicians may be tempted to 
regard the abortion question as arising from contemporary social and 
scientific considerations, its legal and philosophical bases stretch back into 
classical antiquity.  While abortion opponents speak publicly of protecting 
fetal life, their intellectual predecessors acted out of quite different 
motivations, and appealed to other agendas that could well remain below 
the surface of the current rhetoric.  While abortion rights proponents focus 
their arguments solely on female privacy and autonomy, they ignore 
centuries of fetal protection jurisprudence, which must be conscientiously 
addressed if it is to be subordinated or dispensed with.  Most importantly, 
jurists and policy makers must understand that abortion has always been a 
part of human experience, and remains so when it is prohibited.  
Throughout the nation, as in its capital, women will seek abortions, 
whether access to the procedure is guaranteed or prohibited under the law.
